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Abstract
Currie (2019) has introduced a novel account of creativity within the social
epistemology of science. The account is intended to capture how conservatism can
be detrimental to the health of inquiry within certain scientific communities, given
the aims of research there. I argue that recent remarks by Rovelli (2018) put
pressure on the applicability of the account. Altogether, it seems we do not yet well
understand the relationship between creativity, conservatism, and the health of
inquiry in science.
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1 Introduction
Currie (2019) argues that research in existential risk (‘X-risk’) should be more creative
than it likely is, given the realities of contemporary scientific practice. In the course of
the argument, he introduces a general account of creativity in scientific discovery
(hereafter, ‘creativity’). This account is intended to capture how conservatism can be
detrimental to the health of inquiry in scientific communities, given certain aims of
research. It is also advertised as complementing the use of formal modeling in studying
policy initiatives within the social epistemology of science.
Independent of Currie’s project, Rovelli (2018) decries a “why not?” ideology he
reports is in vogue within his scientific community, engaged in fundamental physics
research. By his reckoning, this ideology promotes a method of guesswork. His concern is
that such a method is detrimental, given facts about his community and their research
aims.
Here, I will argue that Rovelli’s remarks, when interpreted in light of Currie’s
account, raise trouble for the general applicability of the latter. Evidently, Currie’s
account fails to countenance the possibility that revolutionary theorizing might be
valuable, as features in Rovelli’s argument. But since it is difficult to discern when
revolutionary theorizing is likely not valuable to a community, it is unclear when Currie’s
account may be deemed appropriate for studying the effects of conservatism on the
health of inquiry therein. This threatens to undermine the use of such an account in
arguments undergirding policies meant to respond to conservatism. It would be prudent
to seek out means of identifying what it is about any given scientific community that
could render Currie’s account appropriate there.
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2 Creativity in science
Stanford (2019) has argued that the structures and institutions of contemporary science
foster conservatism in research, stifling revolutionary theorizing. Currie (2019) is
concerned that the same conservatism is detrimental to inquiry within X-risk. This is
because, according to Currie, disciplines like X-risk are best pursued creatively. Arguing
that creativity is in tension with conservatism, Currie concludes that the scientific
communities focused on disciplines like X-risk are likely insufficiently creative— the
structures and institutions of science stack the deck against the disciplines’ prospects.
As just presented, Currie’s project depends essentially on his providing an explicit
account of creativity within a scientific community. The remainder of this section is
dedicated to describing the account he provides, as well as developing it further (where
necessary) in a friendly manner.
Consider the situation wherein there is some well-posed problem, whose solution a
scientific community agrees constitutes the aim of their collective research. The
statement of the problem places severe constraints on what counts as viable research
within that community, united by that aim. We may think of the statement of the
problem as characterizing the research program pursued by that community. And
associated with that problem is, following Currie, a collection of possible solutions. This
‘solution space’ is meant to be roughly coextensive with all professional moves available
to members of that community, engaged in that research program. The researchers
occupy points in the solution space, and they choose which points to occupy next.1
1In fact, there are other professional strategies that are ultimately available to researchers,
regarded as decision-making agents. Whether activity gets channeled into those other strategies,
rather than into moving between solutions, is an important degree of freedom in Currie’s account.
3
Currie introduces into this picture the following two metaphors. ‘Hot searches’
through solution space are energetic; ‘cold searches’ are the opposite. A hot search refers
to a sequence of points, whose iterative selection by a theorist describes that theorist as
hopping around through the solution space. A cold search refers to a similar sequence of
points, except that it describes the behavior of a theorist who is nearly staying still.
To make these metaphors, Currie needs a notion of distance between points in the
space. He borrows from Bayesian epistemology to develop one. (I will have more to say
that is critical of this below.) By his reckoning, distances to solutions are relativized to
each individual at a time, and are indexed to that individual’s credences at that time.
So, roughly speaking, solutions assigned low priors are far, and solutions assigned high
priors are near.2
Currie does not elaborate on the interpretation of these priors. Evidently, he has in
mind something pragmatic: “Our priors serve to set expectations across a space of
possible solutions to a problem” [p. 6]. In this respect, the account is non-committal
about what it is that ultimately makes a solution worth visiting. We are free to suppose
that there is some unspecified constellation of virtues, possibly specific to the research
program at hand, that one hopes is jointly maximized (i.e. via some method of
aggregation) by whatever solution is visited next. On this picture, hot searches are
sequences for which the researcher’s decisions are insensitive to their beliefs about where
it will be prudent to visit. Oppositely, cold searches occur when the researcher’s choices
correlate strongly with those beliefs.
Currie then defines an agent’s creativity in terms of their propensity for hot searches.
2As will become clear, it may be that we ought to insert a ceteris paribus clause here. If so,
we would say that whatever are otherwise the distances to solutions, those numerical values are
then systematically deformed to reflect comparative facts about one’s priors over each solution.
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In other words, an agent is creative in proportion to the unconditional probability that
they attempt a distant, low-credence solution. A community’s creativity, meanwhile, is
defined to correspond with what would generally occur if the members of the community
were all individually creative. The upshot is that a community’s creativity is defined as
proportional to the efficiency with which they explore solution space widely. (What it
means to explore widely is, of course, agent-relative. Here, we might assume that a
community explores widely when it does so by the lights of most of its members.)
This wide exploration of solution space is in contrast with what, following Currie, we
may call ‘pooling’. Intuitively, pooling occurs when individuals within the community
fail to be creative, each favoring cold searches instead of hot searches. But, as Currie
notes, pooling may be avoided in such a case, provided that the community is cognitively
diverse. So long as cognitive diversity is understood in terms of diverse distributions of
priors, cognitively diverse individuals engaging in cold searches will, collectively, explore
widely. This community would count as creative, according to Currie, even though the
individuals who comprise it do not.
The creativity of a community is therefore not uniquely determined by facts about
the creativity of its constituents. Their propensity for peer disagreement (and so, the
social structure of science, etc.) also matters. And according to this view, a community
may be made more creative in various ways. One way is by interventions to promote
sustained cognitive diversity, as we have understood it here. Another is by incentivizing
hot searches, or increasing creativity at the individual level. In both cases, pooling is
reduced, in favor of wider exploration.3
3A third way to increase creativity, noted by Currie, is to impose on the community a diverse
collection of search algorithms. But this raises a question: what distinguishes, in practice, our
imposing a diverse collection of search algorithms from our incentivizing hot searches? At the
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Building on recent work by Stanford (2019), such interventions are, according to
Currie, in contrast with the unchecked effects of conservatism in professional science
today. This is because, according to Currie, conservatism promotes pooling, as we have
understood it here. But depending on the given research program, it may or may not be
detrimental that science today is, generally, conservative. This is because a research
program ought to be assessed individually, according to the “local details” [p. 3] relevant
to it. Those details determine, for instance, whether the community is better off
investing in strategies other than those relevant to scientific discovery (cf. footnote 1
above). If so, any resulting pooling according to shared priors need not be unhealthy.
As just stated, the utility of Currie’s account is ultimately going to rest on certain
further facts: which kinds of local details ought we to recognize as rendering creativity—
as opposed to pooling— a standard of good epistemic health in the community? Such
local details are encoded, we may suppose, in the statement of the problem that
constitutes the aim of that community’s research. Recall that it is from this problem
that, in principle, we may extract the parameters of the solution space we envision the
community to explore. It follows that assessments of the local details of a research
program will generally shape our expectations about the solution space associated with
the problem. Likewise, facts about a solution space can correlate with facts about
whether pooling or creativity is preferred in the corresponding research program.
Unfortunately, Currie does not state how such a correlation would work. This
omission could suggest that we ought not to regard local details as shaping our
level of analysis presently provided, it is unclear that there is any distinction. As suggested in
footnote 2, it may be that we should ultimately think of solution space as admitting some intrinsic
structure, independent of credences. In that case, search algorithms could be defined with respect
to that intrinsic structure, and would generally result in searches that appear hot.
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expectations about solution space (besides via shaping our priors). But this would
render Currie’s account in tension with the standard interpretation of formal landscape
models. Currie regards the use of such models within the social epistemology of science
as complementing his approach (cf. p. 11 in the article). In such models, one typically
regards the intrinsic structure of the landscape as an independent variable, whose
possible values encode arbitrary research environments. So too, we might conclude, the
structure of a solution space should reflect facts about the corresponding research
program.
In light of this, I think it is appropriate to regard Currie’s discussion of X-risk as
illustrating the reasoning that would shape the relevant solution space. His ultimate
conclusion is that X-risk should be creative because it should be “multi-disciplinary,
pluralistic, and opportunistic” [p. 26]. We might speculate, on the basis of this, that the
local details relevant to the problem of X-risk render the solution space as unusually
vast.4 In a vast solution space, cold searches could seem unfruitful, no matter how
cognitively diverse we may plausibly imagine are the researchers. Consequently,
creativity is generally preferred in such a case, consistent with Currie’s reasoning about
X-risk.
To recap: treating research programs as solution spaces, creativity is a matter of how
the relevant communities explore those spaces, given priors. Conservatism encourages
pooling according to shared priors, which is opposite creative exploration. But specific
facts about the solution space at hand can determine, in a given community, which of
4There is room for disagreement here. For instance, Currie’s discussion of X-risk places some
emphasis on its normative aspect— i.e. threat mitigation— and its role in the public eye. It
is not clear what these would have to do with the size of the solution space. This ambiguity
motivates a revisionist attitude toward distances in the space. (See also footnotes 2 and 3 above.)
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creativity or pooling is likely preferred. Those facts are ultimately grounded in the
statement of the problem identified by that community as constituting their research
program.
3 The situation in fundamental physics
Consider now the article by Rovelli (2018). Rovelli is a theoretical physicist focused on
quantum gravity, the problem that characterizes fundamental physics research today.5
Indeed, we may understand the problem of quantum gravity to be that which shapes the
relevant solution space, against which creativity in fundamental physics is to be assessed.
In what follows, I take Rovelli to have expertise regarding that solution space, as well as
privileged access to it.
Rovelli’s article is adversarial. Our attention is best directed to a passage that comes
in the middle, immediately following his presentation of what he calls the “why not?”
ideology. According to Rovelli, this uncritical ideology is responsible for the rise of a
damaging method of guesswork in contemporary fundamental physics practice.
According to the method, reason need not be (nor can be, fruitfully) given to merit the
study of any new research proposal. The criticism of the method proceeds as follows [p.
7]:
Arbitrary jumps in the unbounded space of possibilities have never been
an effective way to do science. The reason is twofold: first, there are too
many possibilities, and the probability of stumbling on a good one by pure
5This is, of course, a massive simplification. But so too is the problem characterizing X-risk
in Currie’s project. Whether the simplification is tolerable despite such objections depends on
the particular context of its use.
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chance is negligible; but more importantly, nature always surprises us and
we, the limited critters that we are, are far less creative and imaginative than
we may think. When we consider ourselves to be “speculating widely”, we are
mostly playing out rearrangements of old tunes: true novelty that works is
not something we can just find by guesswork.
As in Currie’s article, we have here a spatial account of scientific discovery. Scientists
decide how to move amongst points in the space (now, of ‘possibilities’, rather than
‘solutions’). The role of the “why not?” ideology is to support a method of guesswork.
We can understand this method as a decision procedure, the repeated execution of which
amounts to “arbitrary jumps” in the space. (More formally, we might think of such a
method as analogous to Monte Carlo sampling, with respect to some unspecified
probability distribution on the space. Based on the context surrounding the quoted
passage, Rovelli clearly has in mind a distribution that is meant to be uncorrelated with
one’s priors.) But absent any greater detail about the account Rovelli envisages, it is
unclear why such a method should be as damaging as he claims. Prima facie, Currie’s
account of creativity should be helpful as a means to interpret the argument.
In Currie’s framework, Rovelli’s ‘space of possibilities’ may be understood as a
solution space for the problem of quantum gravity. The solutions to the problem are,
then, candidates for what may turn out to be a satisfying theory of quantum gravity.
Given this reading, Rovelli’s principal claim about the space is that it is vast. This seems
right. In other contexts, this space is taken to be synonymous with ‘theory space’, the
collection of all possible fundamental theories (see, e.g. (Dardashti, 2019)). From here
onward, I will adopt this ‘theory space’ language when talking about the space of
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solutions relevant to the problem of quantum gravity.6
Recall that creativity at the community level is spelled out, on Currie’s account, in
terms of exploring widely in the relevant solution space. I have suggested that we
understand Rovelli’s remarks in terms of fundamental physicists exploring the vast
theory space corresponding to the problem of quantum gravity. Since the space is vast,
by the argument at the end of the previous section, creativity is likely preferred to
pooling. In other words, a more creative community is likely better off, given the local
details of the problem of quantum gravity. Wider exploration should be good here.
Meanwhile, fundamental physicists are, according to Rovelli, uncreative (or, at least,
are “far less creative” than they may think).7 On the present interpretation, this would
suggest that fundamental physicists fail to explore widely. Increasing creativity should
be desirable.
Naively, guesswork is one such method to do so. (As described above, except if the
sampling is with respect to a probability distribution correlated with one’s priors,
guesswork will generally produce hot searches.) On Currie’s account, we may thereby
understand Rovelli to hold the view that the method of guesswork happens to be
implemented poorly by his community. Moreover, according to Rovelli, when his
community engages in guesswork, they fail to speculate as “widely” as they typically
believe themselves to speculate. So: the community does not explore widely, and they
fail to recognize that this is the case.
This seems to provide a sufficient reason that the method is, according to Rovelli,
6In (Schneider, 2020), I criticize the relevance of this ‘theory space’ view in assessing the
methodology of quantum gravity research.
7What relation this testimony could bear to the broader conversation about conservatism in
science is interesting to consider, but a tangent at present.
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damaging. Because theory space is vast, creativity constitutes a standard of good
epistemic health in contemporary fundamental physics. Meanwhile, the community’s
poor implementation of guesswork fosters an exaggerated perspective as to how healthy
their inquiry really is. Our initial hunch was correct: Currie’s account of creativity can
help us get traction on Rovelli’s argument.
Yet, there is something unsatisfying about this interpretation of the argument.
Consider the reason that Rovelli supplies for his testimony that the community
implements the method of guesswork poorly. The poor implementation is due to the fact
that “we, limited critters that we are, are far less creative and imaginative than we may
think”. In other words, guesswork is implemented poorly by his community, because
their being limited ensures that they cannot implement it well. In particular, it his
community’s lacking creativity (and imagination), on this interpretation, that ultimately
bears responsibility for the method being damaging.
Whether Rovelli’s argument is compelling, so interpreted, is therefore going to turn
on whether a community’s lacking creativity can be understood to intervene on the
efficacy of a method they attempt to employ. And here, Currie’s account provides little
guidance. Facts about the community’s pooling with respect to shared priors cannot
obviously prohibit researchers, all of whom are willing to speculate irrespective of their
priors, from doing so. In this respect, Rovelli’s argument depends on creativity (or the
lack thereof) playing a further role in the social epistemology of his community than is
readily countenanced by Currie’s account.
Note that this observation does not present an objection to Currie’s argument, as his
argument does not require that his account of creativity be complete. Nonetheless, as I
will now discuss, Rovelli’s argument is ultimately compelling, provided that we attribute
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to Rovelli the view that revolutionary theorizing is valuable in contemporary
fundamental physics. And recognizing the importance of such a view to Rovelli’s
argument should make us wary about assertions that Currie’s account is applicable in
any particular epistemic situation. Currie’s account cannot merely be assumed to
capture how to assess the epistemic impact of conservatism on a research program, for
which creativity is healthy. A further question about whether or not revolutionary
theorizing is valuable complicates the assessment.
4 Revolutionary theorizing and the health of inquiry
Suppose that there exist possibilities in theory space that are assigned prior probabilities
of zero by all members of the community. Whereas many possibilities are accessible to
the community, in virtue of being assigned non-zero priors by someone, these further
possibilities are inaccessible. On Currie’s terms, these are possibilities that are located
an infinite distance away from the community, and are regarded as infinitely less
promising to visit than any accessible possibility.8
In such a case, no matter how creative the community is regarding the accessible
possibilities, some of theory space will never be explored. So, provided that guesswork
fails to be defined over inaccessible possibilities, the method could fail to spread the
community as wide as might, ultimately, be desired. This idealized setup sounds
8Assignments of zero-probability priors to non-contradictions are antithetical to an orthodox
Bayesian epistemology. So, it is not obvious that the present supposition, in the case of theory
space, is faithful to Currie’s project. Nonetheless, given some other structure to the space (cf.
footnotes 2-4), we may understand zero-probability priors as an idealization that “pushes off to
infinity” the corresponding possibilities. They are, in effect, disconnected from the accessible
ones. No amount of information gleaned from work on the latter could ever reign them in.
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promising as a means to recover why, according to Rovelli, his community cannot
implement guesswork well. We need only to attribute to Rovelli two further claims. The
first is that his community’s lack of creativity results in there being some possibilities
that are inaccessible. The second is that at least some of those inaccessible possibilities
are important to the aims of his community’s research.
Evidence that Rovelli would endorse each of these claims may be found within the
passage already quoted. Namely, what is inadequate about guesswork, says Rovelli, is
that it does not yield “true novelty that works”. This is because employing it results
(instead) in “playing out rearrangements of old tunes”. If we interpret the
rearrangements of old tunes as the accessible possibilities, his claim is this: what there is
to be sought in fundamental physics— i.e. true novelty that works— in fact resides in
the inaccessible part of theory space.
Suppose that this reading is correct, and what there is to be sought in fundamental
physics is, according to Rovelli, presently inaccessible. Then it is a symptom of the
community’s not being creative, according to Rovelli, that the implementation of
guesswork necessarily fails to engender wide enough exploration. This is because the
relevant sampling procedures fail to be defined over the whole of what is worth exploring.
We have thereby found a means to articulate the lingering part of Rovelli’s argument,
which we were unable to do in the previous section. Namely, says Rovelli: what is worth
exploring fails to be coextensive with the accessible part of theory space. As a result,
guesswork is ineffectual. Worse, employing the method misleads the community in their
self-assessment of whether they are sufficiently creative, consonant with their research
aims. This is because the method only promotes wide exploration of a kind that is
unsuitable for assessing the health of inquiry in fundamental physics. It only
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countenances that which is conceived as worth exploring (i.e. rather than what is).
If this is how we are to understand Rovelli’s argument, it is easy to generalize the
lesson. Consider any context wherein one has reason to regard the accessible part of
solution space as failing to include some of what is worth exploring (putting off, at least
for another few paragraphs, the issue of what it means for something to be worth
exploring). This is a context in which genuinely revolutionary theorizing is needed,
which renders accessible more of the space. In other words, if a community has reason to
value revolutionary theorizing in their research, no amount of hot searching amidst that
which is conceivable will amount to healthy inquiry. This is despite creativity remaining
a standard of good health in that community, given their research aims.
But such a conclusion spells trouble for the applicability of Currie’s account in
arguments about policy. Currie’s observation, as discussed above, is that conservatism
promotes pooling with respect to shared priors. To the extent that creativity is
anticorrelated with such pooling, Currie concludes research programs that ought to be
creative likely suffer, in virtue of conservatism. Therefore, interventions that would
promote creativity in the relevant communities would be well motivated, given the
broader context of science today. (Indeed, this is just what Currie calls for in the case of
X-risk.)
But now, there is cause to doubt that creativity has anything to do systematically
with pooling, as defined with respect to shared priors. Creativity may, for instance, be
anticorrelated with an entirely different kind of failure to explore, measured against an
entirely different distance measure on the space. At least when revolutionary theorizing
is valued, this seems to be the case. Indeed, one might even imagine situations wherein
pooling, as measured against priors, provides explicit means of playing with what it is
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that we conceive as worth exploring. (Rovelli seems to have something like this in mind
in his advocating for a method built on continuity, in order to break away from playing
rearrangements of old tunes.)
If so, interventions to promote creativity cannot be motivated against a background
of conservatism, at least as Currie has presented the topic. In cases such as these, we
require a different sort of reason to motivate interventions in response to conservatism
(when, still, creativity is important). For instance, suppose that the conclusion is
warranted: conservatism deprives the relevant community of access to much of solution
space (cf. footnote 7). Then it is plausible that what is sought by the community is
inaccessible, in which case revolutionary theorizing might be valuable. Policies intended
to promote creativity in that community could then be motivated, given the broader
conservatism of science today. (And enacting such policies would be all the more
important if, following Stanford, we further regard conservatism as stifling revolutionary
theorizing.)
On the other hand, we might imagine some cases (perhaps that of X-risk) in which
Currie’s account adequately captures the effects of conservatism on inquiry. These are
cases where we regard a community’s capacity for revolutionary theorizing as,
antecedently, unimportant to assessing the health of inquiry therein.
Such cases may arise in practice. But if they do, it is very difficult— if not
impossible— to reliably identify them as such. What is up for grabs here is our epistemic
access to whether that which we presently conceive as worth exploring happens to be
coincident with that which is worth exploring. This is one lesson of Stanford’s original
project, which foremost concerned our means of evaluating the contemporary threats
posed by the problem of unconceived alternatives. The upshot is that there may turn out
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to be no problem inherent in the applicability of Currie’s account in certain cases. Yet,
there is a severe problem in asserting when we are reliably in such a case. This matters
for the argumentative force of any call for new incentives to promote creativity in any
particular community, based on his account. Namely, one must commit to the belief
that, whatever it means for a solution to be worth exploring— i.e. given the ultimate
aims of the community’s research, the individuals’ understandings of the problem that
shapes that research, and so on— that solution is presently conceived as such.
Whether Currie’s account can provide insight into the effect of conservatism on
inquiry will therefore require a more sophisticated understanding of creativity. Such an
understanding would need to provide a reliable means of picking out those situations
wherein the benefits of creativity are not to do with revolutionary theorizing. In those
situations, Currie’s account could give us some grasp of how to evaluate the epistemic
health of the relevant community. But the grounds for that evaluation would ultimately
reside in the more sophisticated account. This is because only according to that more
sophisticated account could we explain in virtue of what revolutionary theorizing is, in
the particular case at hand, rendered unimportant.
5 Conclusion
I have argued that Rovelli’s remarks ultimately uncover a shortcoming of Currie’s
account of creativity. This shortcoming concerns the possible value of revolutionary
theorizing to the aims of a research program. Lacking a more sophisticated account of
creativity, it is difficult to assess a variety of claims of independent interest. For instance,
what commitments does Rovelli make about the problem of quantum gravity, in order to
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claim that revolutionary theorizing is valuable within contemporary fundamental
physics? And when is it appropriate to focus questions about creativity exclusively on
just what is conceived as worth exploring? After all, Currie is unequivocal about the
relevance of his more narrow account of creativity in the case of X-risk. He states: “...it
is this kind of creativity which scientific study of existential risk requires” [p. 8]. So, by
what reasons do the local details of X-risk entitle us to restrict our study to an account
that disregards the possibility that revolutionary theorizing matters?
Currie anticipates the possibility that a more sophisticated notion of creativity might
ultimately be demanded. By his reckoning, this is because his account does not capture
‘ingenuity’ (p. 8), failing to distinguish creative searches from chaotic ones. Currie then
suggests that a new account of creativity, built on the notion of creative ‘flair’ developed
by Gaut (2010), might capture such a distinction.
This suggestion strikes me as promising. For instance, creative searches might be
those hot searches that enable the community to subsequently achieve novelty in
research (e.g. at the end of some iterative process). But I would like to conclude by
noting one major obstruction to developing the suggestion further. Following Currie, the
first step in articulating an account of creativity would be to specify how to extrapolate
from the individual to the community level. Such a move is essential to an
understanding of the relationship between the social structure of science and creativity,
like we have understood it here. (Of particular interest is whether conservatism can be
responsible for reliably depriving us of access to much of a solution space, within the
developed account.) But extrapolating from the individual to the community level is no
small challenge. Creative flair is an irreducibly agential notion, concerning an
individual’s familiarity with their own goals. It is unclear at present what would mark a
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community that, as a whole, is creative in this refined, goal-sensitive respect.
There is, it seems, still much work to be done.
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